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COMES NOW Defendant-Appellant and pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
herewith moves the Court for a rehearing on both matters pending 
before this Court and in support of this motion respectfully 
states that this Court has overlooked or misapprehended the 
following points of law or fact: 
No. 19990 & 20070 
I 
ARGUMENT 
1. In case number 19990, jury instruction 6(3) 
imposes an unconstitutional burden upon Defendant-Appellant and 
relieves the State of its burden of proof. 
Jury instruction 6(3) states in pertinent part as 
follows: 
The Utah statutes provide that if a person 
has possession of property recently stolen 
and gives no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession . . . the jury may conclude the 
person had an intent to deprive the true 
owner of the property and may convict him, if 
all the circumstances do, in fact, satisfy 
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant is guilty thereof. (emphasis 
added) 
While this matter was pending, but before the Court's 
decision thereon, this Court ruled in the case of State v. 
Chambers, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (1985) at 18 
that a jury instruction using the 
language of U.C.A., 1953, Section 76-6-402(1) 
is unconstitutional because it directly 
relates to the issue of guilt and relieves 
the State of its burden of proof. 
The Court further states in the Chambers case at 18 
that 
. the statutory language should not be 
used in any form in instructing jurys in 
criminal cases, and we expressly disavow the 
language and holdings of our earlier cases to 
the contrary. 
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The instruction to which Defendant objects in this case 
suffers from the same constitutional infirmities as the 
instruction in the Chambers case* Although the instruction in 
this case does not contain the words "prima facie," its effect is 
the same in that the instruction creates a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption. In Chambers this Court discussed Francis v. 
Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985) and the case of Sandstrom v^ 
Montana 442 US 510 (1979). In this Court's analysis, those two 
United States Supreme Court cases have established the principle 
that a presumption in a criminal case, albeit a rebuttable one, 
is unconstitutional. As this Court quoted from the Sandstrom 
decision, found at 1972-1973: 
A mandatory rebuttable presumption 
relieves the State of the affirmative burden 
of pursuasion on the presumed element by 
instructing the jury that it must find the 
presumed element unless the defendant 
pursuades the jury not to make such a 
finding. A mandatory rebuttable presumption 
is perhaps less onerous [than an irrebuttable 
or conclusive presumption] from the 
defendant's perspective, but it is no less 
unconstitutional. 
It is, therefore, Defendant's position in this case 
that the instruction set forth above provides a rebuttable 
presumption; that it imposes upon Defendant the obligation of 
giving a "satisfactory explanation of such possession . . .ff of 
allegedly stolen property, and that such requirement violates the 
mandates of those authorities set forth above. 
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2. In case #20070 the State's expert witness did not 
testify to the fair market value of the allegedly stolen 
property. 
The State's expert witness, both in oral testimony and 
written appraisal, which was admitted into evidence as State's 
exhibit 6-P, never established what the fair market value of the 
allegedly stolen property was. The exhibit itself states that 
$2,878.00 was the replacement value of the ring in question. 
Furthermore, Mr. West stated (R,399-R,400) that "a good part" of 
his appraisals were for insurance purposes and would, therefore, 
go to the replacement value of an item, as would the estate 
appraisal. Mr. West recognized (R,400 18-23) that the definition 
of the fair market value of any item is the price a willing buyer 
and a willing seller can agree upon. Mr. West further stated at 
(R,400 21-23) that "nobody can say for sure what two people are 
going to determine what that might be." 
The point is that Mr. West was asked and gave the 
replacement value of the item for insurance purposes or for 
estate value, but at no time was he asked and at no time did he 
give any opinion regarding the fair market value of the ring in 
question. 
3. In case number 20070, the misstatements of fact in 
the underlying affidavit for search warrant were not "minor 
discrepancies" and were in fact made knowingly and intentionally. 
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This Court has held in its previous decision that the 
allegations in the affidavit for search warrant were "essentially 
accurate." 25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. Defendant contends that the 
affidavit must fail because the statements were false. The 
affiant's misstatements of fact in the affidavit for search 
warrant (R3-4) are highlighted below, with an explanation of the 
basis of Defendant's contentions as follows: 
Slowe was told by John Gallegos that the ring is 
stolen and that he needed some quick cash. 
This statement is absolutely false by reason of the 
fact that Cottam, the affiant, had absolutely no conversation 
with Gallegos after the "reverse sting" operation but prior to 
executing the affidavit. Cottam testified at a suppression 
hearing that after the "reverse sting11 operation that Cottam 
received a hand signal from Gallegos !f. . . to be shown as to 
whether or not a sale had been made or not.'1 (R200, L 24-R200 
LI) 
Cottam then testified that he met Gallegos and had a 
conversation of approximately 15 seconds with him prior to 
executing the affidavit for search warrant. (R202, L7) CottanTs 
recollection of the conversation was as follows: 
I said did the deal go down exactly as we 
talked about, and he said yes, he bought it, 
and he showed me the money. (R202, L9-13) 
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According to Cottam's own testimony, the only 
information that Gallegos gave him was that information set forth 
above. However, none of that information is stated as part of 
the grounds for issuance of the search warrant. Cottam, in the 
affidavit, is speaking in the first person, and nowhere does it 
say that John Gallegos provided the information. Since the 
alleged "facts'1 were not known to Cottam, and since he had not 
been told them, he cannot legally have stated them as fact on the 
affidavit. These allegations are pure assumptions on the part of 
Cottam. 
Slowe purchased the ring, believing it was 
stolen, and the ring is currently in the 
business at this time. 
The first statement that MSlowe purchased the ring" in 
and of itself may be an accurate statement, but it does not state 
the source of the statement. The affidavit, written in the first 
person, leaves only the conclusion that that information is in 
the affiant's mind at the time he executed the affidavit. 
However, such is not true. As discussed above, after the 
operation was terminated, the only information provided by John 
Gallegos to the affiant was a 15 second conversation wherein 
Gallegos told Cottam that Slowe had purchased the ring and 
Gallegos showed Cottam the money. (R202, L9-11) There is, 
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however, no statement in the affidavit that this allegation is 
based on the hearsay information of the police informant, 
certainly an important piece of information to the magistrate. 
The statement of Slowe's "believing it was stolen,ff is 
merely a conclusion on the part of the affiant, and has no basis 
in fact whatsoever. It may have been Mr. Cottam's assumption 
that Slowe knew the ring was stolen, but certainly such an 
assumption is not competent information to provide for the 
issuance of a search warrant based thereon. 
These acts were recorded on tape and observed 
by affiant and other police officers nearby. 
Again, this statement is entirely erroneous. Cottam 
admitted that he was not able to see the alleged sale, (R206, 
L18; and R208, Ll-7) neither did Cottam hear the transaction 
prior to executing the affidavit. (R206, L25 - R207, L8) 
Furthermore, Cottam was not told by either of the detectives 
supossedly observing the transaction, i.e. Hall or Garrett, what 
those officers saw, if anything. (R197, 14-16 and R209, L6-10) 
Neither did Cottam know if the transaction had been 
actually recorded on tape, as he alleged in the affidavit. (R198, 
3-6) 
The allegations made by Cottam in the affidavit were 
purely and simply assumptions that Cottam anticipated would have 
occurred by the time he actually executed the pre-prepared 
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affidavit. The point is, if the alleged "facts" which Cottam 
made but which were unknown to him are deleted from the grounds 
for issuance of the search warrant, only the following remains: 
On 12/15/83, police agent John Gallegos 
entered the business of Crazy Horse Jewelry, 
2470 Washington, . . . Slowe purchased the 
ring, . . . and the ring is currently in the 
business at this time. 
Certainly the foregoing "facts" do not come even close 
to providing the information necessary to establish probable 
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 
Although Cottam at no point in the affidavit ever gave 
any indication whatsoever that Gallegos, the police informant, 
was the source of any of the "facts" alleged in the affidavit 
Cottam goes on to justify on page 2 of the affidavit that 
Gallegos was a reliable source of information as follows: 
Your affiant considers the information 
received from the confidential informant 
reliable because: Gallegos has assisted 
police on prior occasions, resulting in the 
clearance of more than 25 burglaries, and 
several felony arrests and convictions. 
In the first place, as alluded to above, the affiant 
never once indicated that any information in or on the affidavit 
was received from Gallegos. The entire affidavit is written in 
the first person and one must assume therefrom that all of the 
"facts" alleged therein were within the mind of the affiant. 
Certainly hearsay information is not inadmissable for purposes of 
the issuance of a search warrant. However, such information must 
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certainly be identified as such. The foregoing is, then, merely 
surplusage which pretends to support the unidentified information 
supposedly provided by a confidential informant, and even fails 
to state any "underlying circumstances'1 to establish the 
credibility of any confidential informant as required by the 
United States Supreme Court in the tests of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 732 (1964) and Spinelli v_^  
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 21 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1969), 
or the comprehensive test propounded by that Court in Illinois v. 
Yeates, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1983). 
Again, the statement itself is not only unreliable 
because it fails to meet the tests set forth above, but it is 
inherently misleading because it pretends to provide additional 
information establishing the credibility of an informant who has 
not even been identified as the source of any information in the 
search warrant. To propound the problem the affiant alleges 
certain "facts" to corroborate information received from the 
confidential informant by stating: 
The following information corroborates the 
facts given by the confidential informant: 
Police officers recorded the conversation by 
use of a tape recorder and had constant view 
of the store and on-sight view of our 
informant. 
Again, there can be no ''corroboration11 of facts given 
by any confidential informant when none of the information 
contained anywhere in the affidavit is identified as having come 
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from said any confidential informant. It would be one thing if 
Cottam had stated "Gallegos, a police informant, stated . . ." 
However, he did not. The reader of the affidavit cannot tell 
from the 4 corners of the affidavit what, if any,information was 
received by Cottam from Gallegos. Secondly, the allegation that 
the police officers recorded the conversation and had "constant" 
view of the store and "on-sight" view of the informant is 
entirely erroneous and without any foundation whatsoever. As is 
discussed above, Cottam had no conversations with any of the 
detectives after the operation and prior to the execution of the 
search warrant during which he could have obtained any of the 
information set forth. At that point neither did Cottam know 
whether the conversation had been recorded by the narcotics 
bureau office (R198, L3-6) and during his 15 second conversation 
with Gallegos had no opportunity to discuss with the matter with 
Gallegos or verify whether or not the conversation had actually 
been recorded. Furthermore, Cottam admitted (R196, L24-25) that 
he only was able to see Gallegos arrive at Defendant's place of 
business and leave, and stated that he himself could not see what 
was going on the inside of Defendant's business during the 
transaction. (R196, L25 through R197, LI) 
Again, the information provide by Cottam in the 
affidavit is nothing more than Cottam's assumption that the 
conversations were recorded and that officers had constant view 
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of the store and on-sight view of the informant. This statement 
on the part of Cottam is at best misleading and at worst a 
serious misstatement of what actually occurred. 
Defendant does not accuse the officer who submitted the 
search warrant affidavit with "recklessly" submitting a false 
affidavit in the criminal sense. However, Defendant does argue 
that the affiant submitted the same intentionally and knowingly 
in the sense that the affiant knew and recognized the acts he 
performed and the result that was to follows. 
The definitions of "intentionally11 and "knowingly," in 
the criminal code, while perhaps creating a standard higher that 
contemplated here, nonetheless provide a basis for Defendant's 
allegations. The definition of "intentionally" at 76-2-103, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) is that conduct is so done ". . . when it 
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result." As for "knowingly," a person acts ". 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result." 
Surely it is clear from the record that the affiant had 
that kind of intent and knowledge. Since the affiant had 
discussed the matters with no one prior to his execution of the 
affidavit, it can hardly be said that he did not know he was 
making false statements. While the affiant may have understood 
in the general sense that the other officers to whom he 
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attributes information he put in his affidavit did actually see 
the circumstances unfold, nevertheless, the affiant did not know 
those facts, and his statements to the contrary are erroneous. 
II 
CONCLUSION 
Jury instruction 6(3) in case 19990 is unconstitutional 
in that it imposes upon Defendant a burden proscribed by law. 
The Chambers decision referred to herein clearly requires this 
Court to strike down the conviction and grant a new trial. 
In case number 20070 the State's expert witness Mr. 
West utterly failed to establish the fair market value of the 
allegedly stolen merchandise in accordance with the Court's 
instruction (R.76) that fair market value is . . . 
the highest price, estimated in terms of 
money, for which the property would have sold 
in the open market at the time and in that 
locality, if the owner was desirous of 
selling, but under no urgent necessity of 
doing so, and if the buyer was desirous of 
buying but under no urgent necessity of so 
doing, and if the seller had a reasonable 
time within which to find a purchaser, and 
the buyer had knowledge of the character of 
the property and of the uses to which it 
might be put. 
Defendant contends that Mr. West was never even 
qualified as an expert within the requirements imposed by the 
Court. The information he gave was competent only as evidence of 
replacement value or estate value, neither of which is relevant 
to the issue of fair market value. 
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On the question of the sufficiency of the affidavit for 
search warrant in #20070, this Court has, in its previous ruling, 
validated an affidavit containing major misstatements of fact on 
the part of the affiant. As a matter of policy, this Court 
should require more than a collection of assumptions in affidavit 
form before it validates a serious intrusion into areas protected 
by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests 
that this matter be reheard in its entirety. 
DATED this JJ+ day of January, 1986. 
Peter W/ Guyon 
Attorney for Def^n^ant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER 
I, Peter W. Guyon, counsel for Petitioner, hereby 
certify that the instant petition for rehearing is presented in 
good faith and not for purposes of~\delay. 
{ l l ' N V 
Peter W. Guyon 
Attorney for Defen4ant-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned certifies that on the date below a true 
and correct copy of Defendant-Appellant's MOTION FOR REHEARING 
AND ORDER GRANTING SAME was mailed to David L. Wilkinson, 
Attorney General of the State of Utah, ATTN: Sandra L. Sjogren, 
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114 with all postal and other fees prepaid. 
day of January, 1986. 
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